

# United States of America

## Introduction

This page provides a country-specific quantitative overview of the foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) phenomenon. This includes, where available, a breakdown of how many individuals departed from or have returned to the country as well as certain demographics within those groups. The data is laid out below in infographics, you can hover over a data point to see its exact figures. Where not enough data is available the table is grayed out. If you can assist in completing this data, please click fill out the questionnaire on our [contact page](#).

Below this information, the page also sets out in detail a qualitative review of the policy measures utilized by or available to the country in response to the FTF phenomenon and provides a list of additional reading material relevant to the FTF situation in the country.

*Last updated: 14 April 2025.*

United States		
Totals	Total (Departed)	272 <sup>1</sup>
	Total (Non-Returned)	1 <sup>2</sup>
	Total (Returned)	50 <sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Some sources estimate a total of 300 FTFs (see: Mehra, T., Herbach, M., Margolin, D., Doctor, A.C., 'Trends in the Return and Prosecution of ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighters in the United States', ICCT/NCITE Report, August 2023, <https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/2023-08/NCITE%20final%20with%20alt%20cover.pdf>) while others cite a figure of 272, noting that 28 individuals were intercepted before reaching Iraq or Syria (see: Cook, J. and Vale, G., 'From Daesh to 'Diaspora' II: The Challenges Posed by Women and Minors After the Fall of the Caliphate', CTC Sentinel, 12:6, July 2019, p. 30-45, <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/CTC-SENTINEL-062019.pdf>).

<sup>2</sup> 'Hoda Muthana: Alabama IS bride loses appeal for return to US', BBC News, 12 January 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-59974939>; 'Northeast Syria: Fate of Hundreds of Boys Trapped in Siege Unknown', Human Rights Watch, 4 February 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/04/northeast-syria-fate-hundreds-boys-trapped-siege-unknown>; 'Last Known American IS Supporters Repatriated From Syria', VoA News, 1 October 2022, [https://www.voanews.com/a/middle-east\\_last-known-american-supporters-repatriated-syria/6196616.html](https://www.voanews.com/a/middle-east_last-known-american-supporters-repatriated-syria/6196616.html).

<sup>3</sup> Estimate based on the following sources: 'The United States Has Repatriated 27 Americans from Syria and Iraq Including Ten Charged with Terrorism-Related Offenses for Their Support to ISIS', Department of Justice, 1 October 2022, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-has-repatriated-27-americans-syria-and-iraq-including-ten-charged-terrorism>; 'An American Accused of Joining ISIS Is Free, and a Bigger Story Is Beginning', The Atlantic, 8 November 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/11/american-john-doe-released-join->

<b>Nationality (At Departure)</b>	US National	-
	Dual Citizen	-
	Resident	-
<b>Gender</b>	Males (Departed)	-
	Females (Departed)	38 <sup>4</sup>
	Males (Returned)	18 <sup>5</sup>
	Females (Returned)	4 <sup>6</sup>
<b>Parent Status</b>	Female Parent (Non-Returned)	1 <sup>7</sup>
	Female Non-Parent (Non-Returned)	-
	Female Parent (Returned)	-
	Female Non-Parent (Returned)	-
<b>Current Location (Non-Returned)</b>	Died	22 <sup>8</sup>
	In Camps	1 <sup>9</sup>
	In Prison	1 <sup>10</sup>

[isis/574948/](#); Meleagrou-Hitchens, A., Hughes, S. and Clifford, B., 'The Travelers: American Jihadists in Syria and Iraq', George Washington University Program on Extremism, February 2018, [TravelersAmericanJihadistsinSyriaandIraq.pdf\(gwu.edu\)](#); Mehra, T., Herbach, M., Margolin, D., Doctor, A.C., 'Trends in the Return and Prosecution of ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighters in the United States', ICCT/NCITE Report, August 2023, <https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/2023-08/NCITE%20final%20with%20alt%20cover.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> 'Final Report on the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel', Committee on Homeland Security at the House of Representatives, October 2015, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-114HPRT97200/pdf/CPRT-114HPRT97200.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> 9 men returned voluntarily and at least another 9 were repatriated. Source: Mehra, T. et al., 2023

<sup>6</sup> Cook, J. and Vale, G., 'From Daesh to 'Diaspora' II: The Challenges Posed by Women and Minors After the Fall of the Caliphate', CTC Sentinel, 12:6, July 2019, p. 30-45, <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/CTC-SENTINEL-062019.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> 'Alabama Woman Who Joined IS Hopes to Return From Syria Camp', VoA News, 8 January 2023, <https://www.voanews.com/a/alabama-woman-who-joined-is-hopes-to-return-from-syria-camp/6910068.html>.

<sup>8</sup> Meleagrou-Hitchens, A., Hughes, S. and Clifford, B., 'The Travelers: American Jihadists in Syria and Iraq', George Washington University Program on Extremism, February 2018, [TravelersAmericanJihadistsinSyriaandIraq.pdf \(gwu.edu\)](#).

<sup>9</sup> 'Alabama Woman Who Joined IS Hopes to Return From Syria Camp', VoA News, 8 January 2023, <https://www.voanews.com/a/alabama-woman-who-joined-is-hopes-to-return-from-syria-camp/6910068.html>.

<sup>10</sup> 'Northeast Syria: Fate of Hundreds of Boys Trapped in Siege Unknown', Human Rights Watch, 4 February 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/04/northeast-syria-fate-hundreds-boys-trapped-siege-unknown>.

	Operational (in region)	-
	Operational (other regions)	-
	Prosecuted (awaiting trial or convicted and in prison)	-
	Other (Unknown location)	-
<b>Current Legal Status (Non-Returned)</b>	Prosecuted	-
	Held Without Charges	-
	Citizenship Revoked	1 <sup>11</sup>
	Trials in Absentia	-
<b>Current Status (Returned)</b>	Citizenship Revoked	-
	Extradited to Third Country	1 <sup>12</sup>
	Prosecuted	16-18 <sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> 'Hoda Muthana: Alabama IS bride loses appeal for return to US', BBC News, 12 January 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-59974939>; although see also Lind, D., 'The fight over whether ISIS recruit Hoda Muthana is a US citizen, explained', Vox, 22 February 2019, <https://www.vox.com/world/2019/2/22/18236309/hoda-muthana-isis-citizen-trump-pompeo>.

<sup>12</sup> 'An American Accused of Joining ISIS Is Free, and a Bigger Story Is Beginning', The Atlantic, 8 November 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/11/american-john-doe-released-join-isis/574948/>.

<sup>13</sup> Estimate based on the following articles:

Ray, A., 'Prosecuting Western and Non-Western Islamic State Fighters', War On The Rocks, 22 September 2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/prosecuting-western-and-non-western-islamic-state-fighters/>; 'American Woman Who Led ISIS Battalion Sentenced to 20 Years', Department of Justice, 1 November 2022, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/american-woman-who-led-isis-battalion-sentenced-20-years>; 'ISIS 'Beate' Sentenced to Life Imprisonment for Hostage-Taking Scheme that Resulted in the Deaths of American, British, and Japanese Citizens', Department of Justice, 19 August 2022, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/isis-beate-sentenced-life-imprisonment-hostage-taking-scheme-resulted-deaths-american>; 'Michigan Man Convicted on Charges of Providing Material Support To ISIS', Department of Justice, 31 January 2023, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/michigan-man-convicted-charges-providing-material-support-isis>; 'Federal Jury Convicts High-Level ISIS Member of Providing Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization, Including Two Counts Resulting in Death', Department of Justice, 25 May 2022, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-jury-convicts-high-level-isis-member-providing-material-support-foreign-terrorist>; 'ISIS Media Figure and Foreign Fighter Charged with Conspiring to Provide Material Support to a Terrorist Organization, Resulting in Death', Department of Justice, 2 October 2021, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/isis-media-figure-and-foreign-fighter-charged-conspiring-provide-material-support-terrorist>; 'American Man Who Joined ISIS in Syria Sentenced to 20 years', Department of Justice, 31 March 2023, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdfl/pr/american-man-who-joined-isis-syria-sentenced-20-years>; 'American Citizen Convicted of Providing Material Support to ISIS that Resulted in Death and Related Offenses', Department of Justice, 8 February 2023, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/american-citizen-convicted-providing-material-support-isis-resulted-death-and-related>; 'Michigan Man Sentenced to Prison for Providing Material Support To A Terrorist

	Post-release	-
	In Rehabilitation/Reintegration Program	-
	Not prosecuted	3 <sup>14</sup>
<b>Method of Return</b>	Own Initiative	11 <sup>15</sup>
	Expelled	1 <sup>16</sup>
	Repatriated	39 <sup>17</sup>
<b>Returnee Attacks</b>	n/a	-

### Preventive measures

The United States has a public [national security strategy](#). It is a report mandated by Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433).

The Department of Defense also issues a number of fact sheets on different security areas including:

- [Integrated Deterrence, Building Enduring Advantages, and Campaigning](#)
- [Extended Deterrence](#)
- [U.S. Nuclear Capabilities and Modernization](#)
- [U.S. Deterrence Strategy and Policy](#)
- [Arms Control and Nuclear Non-Proliferation](#)

The strategy states a goal of achieving free, open, prosperous, and secure international order that is free in that it allows people to enjoy their basic universal rights and freedoms. In achieving this aim, the US states it will:

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Organization', 15 June 2023, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/michigan-man-sentenced-prison-providing-material-support-terrorist-organization>; 'High-Level Member of ISIS Sentenced to Life in Prison for Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization Resulting in Death', 14 July 2023, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/high-level-member-isis-sentenced-life-prison-material-support-foreign-terrorist-organization>; Mehra, T., Herbach, M., Margolin, D., Doctor, A.C., 'Trends in the Return and Prosecution of ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighters in the United States', ICCT/NCITE Report, August 2023, <https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/2023-08/NCITE%20final%20with%20alt%20cover.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> Meleagrou-Hitchens, A., Hughes, S. and Clifford, B., 'The Travelers: American Jihadists in Syria and Iraq', George Washington University Program on Extremism, February 2018, [TravelersAmericanJihadistsinSyriaandIraq.pdf \(gwu.edu\)](#).

<sup>15</sup> Mehra, T. et al., 2023

<sup>16</sup> 'An American Accused of Joining ISIS Is Free, and a Bigger Story Is Beginning', The Atlantic, 8 November 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/11/american-john-doe-released-join-isis/574948/>.

<sup>17</sup> Mehra, T. et al., 2023

1. invest in the underlying sources and tools of American power and influence;
2. build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance our collective influence to shape the global strategic environment and to solve shared challenges; and
3. modernize and strengthen our military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition with major powers, while maintaining the capability to disrupt the terrorist threat to the homeland.

The strategy states that the approach encompasses all elements of national power – diplomacy, development cooperation, economic statecraft, intelligence, and defense.

Regarding issues related to terrorism and violent extremism, the strategy states that it intends to increase cooperation and support to trusted partners, shifting from a strategy that is “U.S.-led, partner-enabled” to one that is “partner-led, U.S.-enabled.” In doing so the US commits to building or expanding systems to prevent, detect, and respond to threats as they develop—including by strengthening partners’ law enforcement and judicial systems, improving threat information sharing, enhancing border security, countering terrorist financing, targeting terrorist prevention and extremist disengagement programing, and preventing online and offline terrorist recruitment and mobilization to violence.

The strategy also emphasizes the importance of addressing the root causes of radicalization by leveraging U.S. and partner efforts to support effective governance, promote stabilization and economic development, and resolve ongoing conflicts.

Domestically, the US has a [National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism](#). The [first pillar](#) of the strategy highlights the importance of understanding and sharing domestic terrorism-related research and analysis. Efforts are said to be made to enhance and improve information sharing within and across the entire U.S. government and with partners outside of the government, and to illuminate the aspects of this threat that are transnational in nature. A directive for the Department of Homeland Security is also included to utilize and integrate nongovernmental research, intelligence, and analytic products to provide for more comprehensive situational awareness.

The [second pillar](#) of the strategy focuses on prevention, specifically with the mandate to disrupt recruitment into domestic terrorist organizations and stop the mobilization to violence. Since much of the recruitment and incitement takes place through social media and gaming platforms, the strategy allocates additional resources to deal with challenges emanating from online radicalization.

[Pillar three](#) of the strategy outlines how to strengthen the efforts of the government to disrupt and deter domestic terrorism activity, which is primarily the responsibility of the Department of Justice, including the FBI. The strategy emphasizes the importance of allocating more resources and training to investigative and prosecutorial efforts.

The [fourth pillar](#) of the strategy seeks to grapple with long-term contributors to domestic terrorism, stressing the need for civics education and the types of societal

engagement that can foster an understanding of and commitment to the institutions of American democracy. This pillar aims to increase the resilience of America as a country to radicalization, bigotry, hate, and violence. The fourth pillar is anchored in a goal that extends beyond the domestic terrorism threat and aims to safeguard democracy against anyone seeking to do it harm — namely, “enhancing faith in government” and addressing “extreme polarization.”

The US Government focuses on countering extremist narratives through encouraging civil society-led counter-narratives online. In doing so, the Government has established several initiatives to counter radicalization online, namely: creating a digital communications hub to counter propaganda and recruitment efforts of terrorist organizations such as ISIS through engaging with civil society, community and religious leaders; creating a Peer-to-Peer Challenge between students at universities in the US, Canada, the Middle East, North Africa, Australia, Europe, and Asia, these challenges focus on developing digital content to counter messages supporting violent extremism; conducting 'technology camps' whereby social media companies engage with governments, civil society and religious leaders to help them establish digital content to aid the discrediting of violent extremist narratives and to develop and share positive narratives in response.

To counter the risk of radicalization online to violent extremism, the US Department of Homeland Security has established 3 priority actions: to engage with partners in the private sector; to support counter-messaging efforts by technological companies, NGOs, and civic partners; and to protect First Amendment rights and to maintain political neutrality. The first priority relates to identifying tools and methods that private sector partners can use to prevent efforts to radicalize at a local level. Particularly, the DHS seeks to strengthen its relationship with technology sector, such as internet providers and social media companies, to address violent extremism content on their platforms. The second priority focuses on steering individuals away from messaging about violent extremism through increasing information sharing about threats, evaluating counternarrative efforts, and providing funding to effective campaigns that counter narratives of violent extremism.

### Administrative measures

Section 412 of the [PATRIOT Act](#) allows the Attorney General to detain non-citizen individuals suspected of terrorism without charge until they are removed from the country. In order to utilize this measure there must be reasonable grounds to believe that the individual: (1) entered the United States to violate espionage or sabotage laws; (2) entered to oppose the government by force; (3) engaged in terrorist activity; or (4) endangers the United States' national security.

Once the individual is in custody, the Attorney General has seven days to initiate removal proceedings or file criminal charges. If the Attorney General does neither, he is required to release the individual. If the individual has been detained solely under section 412, and his removal is unlikely in the foreseeable future, the Attorney General may, at his discretion, continue to detain the individual for additional periods of up to six months. This extension may be renewed indefinitely. Additional detention periods



are authorized only if releasing the individual will threaten national security or cause harm to the community or any person. The individual has the right to challenge their detention in court by filing a habeas petition in any federal district court that has jurisdiction.

In the [National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012](#), Congress officially affirmed the power of the President under the [Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists](#) to detain without charge or trial, via the Armed Forces, any person, including a U.S. citizen who (1) planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored those responsible for those attacks or (2) was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces. This detention is stipulated in the Act to be detention under the law of war without trial until the end of the hostilities authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force.

Under [Section 340\(a\) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 1952](#), the U.S. government has the power to revoke the citizenship of naturalized citizens when there is sufficient evidence that an individual is subject to one of the grounds of denaturalization. These grounds include the individual being or becoming a member of or affiliated with the Communist Party, another totalitarian party, or a terrorist organization within ten years immediately preceding the filing of the naturalization application or the five years immediately following naturalization.

The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) refers cases for both civil and criminal denaturalization to the Department of Justice and can themselves cancel a Certificate of Citizenship or Certificate of Naturalization. Proceedings are then referred to civil or criminal court. If the government prevails in court, the immigrant reverts from being a US citizen to being a lawful permanent resident (green card holder). And green card holders can be stripped of their legal status, and deported, without a court hearing if they're found to violate the terms of their status (for example, committing certain crimes). The United States, which is not a signatory to the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.

The provisions of Section 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 1952 do not apply to persons who acquired their U.S. citizenship at birth.

Under the [Code of Federal Regulations title 22 § 51.60](#), the Department of State has the power to revoke or refuse issuance of a passport if the Secretary of State determines that the applicant's activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States. It is necessary for the Department of State to provide written notice of this to the subject who may request a hearing to review the basis for the revocation or denial. It is necessary for the Department to receive such a request, in writing, from within 60 days of receipt of the notice. Failure to timely request a hearing means the revocation or denial is the Department's final action.

The US Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury, both in conjunction with the each other and the Attorney General, are authorized to designate and block the assets of foreign individuals and entities that commit, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism. The same power can be imposed on those who provide support, services, or assistance to, or otherwise associate with, designated terrorists and terrorist organizations. The authority for these powers can be found in [Executive Order 13224](#), first introduced in 2001 and renewed every year since.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Department of the Treasury maintains and publishes a consolidated [list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons](#). The published list includes not only Specially Designated Global Terrorists but also beneficiaries of certain authoritarian regimes, international criminals, and organized criminals such as drug traffickers.

Most Specially Designated Global Terrorist Specially Designated Nationals are foreign persons, but it is possible for American citizens to be designated as such as was the case in at least one instance, that of in at least one case, the late Anwar al-Awlaki.

To avoid designated persons or entities transferring funds out of the jurisdiction or otherwise rendering a determination ineffective, section 10 of Executive Order 13224 authorizes the imposition of a determination without prior notice to the subject.

The OFAC states that the ultimate goal of the sanctions list is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. Removal from the sanctions list is possible by requesting reconsideration of OFAC's determination in writing, submitted via post or email to OFAC. This necessarily includes a detailed description of why the listed person should be removed. Additional information may also be submitted, such as arguments or evidence that establishes that an insufficient basis exists for the listing or that the circumstances resulting in the listing no longer apply, any arguments or evidence that establishes that an insufficient basis exists for the listing, or that the circumstances resulting in the listing no longer apply. Procedures governing delisting from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List can be found [here](#).

The US Department of State also maintains a separate [list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations](#) comprised of non-US-based organizations deemed to be involved in terrorist activities. Under [Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965](#), the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism of the United States Department of State continually monitors the activities of groups active around the world to identify targets for terrorist designation. The legal criteria for designation specify that the entity must be a foreign organization, must engage in, or have the capability and intent to engage in, [terrorist activity](#), and that terrorist activity must threaten U.S. national security. In addition to financial sanctions imposed on members of the FTO list, representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they non-U.S. citizens, are inadmissible to and removable from the United States.

Under the [Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004](#), an FTO may file a petition for revocation 2 years after its designation date. In order to provide a basis for revocation, the petitioning FTO must provide evidence that the circumstances



forming the basis for the designation are sufficiently different as to warrant revocation. If no such review has been conducted during a 5 year period with respect to a designation, then the Secretary of State is required to review the designation to determine whether revocation would be appropriate. In addition, the Secretary of State may at any time revoke a designation upon a finding that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation, or that the national security of the United States warrants a revocation. A designation may also be revoked by an Act of Congress, or set aside by a Court order.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Screen Center also keeps a federal terrorism watchlist known as the Terrorist Screening Database containing information on domestic and international individuals reasonably suspected to be involved in terrorism or related activities. Such information includes names, dates of birth, and fingerprints. For security reasons, the TSC does not confirm anyone's status on the watchlist, though it is stated that most people on the terrorism watchlist are not Americans, and have no known connection to the U.S. As of 2016, the Terrorist Watch List is [estimated](#) to contain over 2,484,442 records, consisting of 1,877,133 individual identities. The main source of names for this database is the U.S. government's central database on known or suspected international terrorists, the [Terrorist Identities Datasmart Environment \(TIDE\)](#), which as of October 2020 contained 2.5 million names.

Most people on the Terrorist Watchlist are still able to fly within the U.S. A very small subset of people on this list are on the ["No Fly" list](#), also maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center. The list is made up of people who are prohibited from boarding commercial aircraft for travel within, into, or out of the United States. As of 2013 there were 47,000 names on the No fly List. For travelers who are delayed or denied boarding of an aircraft, consistently receive excess scrutiny at security checkpoints, or are denied entry to the U.S. because they are believed to be or are told that they are on a government watch list, the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program is available. The individual completes an online application at the Department of Homeland Security website, prints and signs the application, and then submits it with copies of several identifying documents. The DHS then reviews the submitted documents.

### Criminal and surveillance measures

**Incitement** is addressed in the United States under [Section 373 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code](#), which makes it an offense for a person to intentionally solicit another to conduct a crime of violence, 'under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent'.

[Section 2339A of Title 18 of the U.S. Code](#) criminalizes providing 'material support or resources' to terrorists (as well as designated foreign terrorist organizations under [Section 2339B](#)), which includes **providing personnel** (one or more individuals who may be or include oneself).

**Participation** in a terrorist organization falls within the scope of material support offenses. Specifically, [Section 2339A of Title 18 of the U.S. Code](#) criminalizes

providing material support or resources to terrorists, which includes the provision of personnel 'who may be or include oneself' (paragraph (b)(1)). Furthermore, a broad range of other forms of support are criminalized under [Section 2339A of Title 18 of the U.S. Code](#) as well as [Section 2339B of Title 18 of the U.S. Code](#), which criminalizes providing material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations. Material support is defined as 'any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel [...], and transportation, except medicine or religious materials'. Additionally, [Section 2339 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code](#) makes it an offense to harbor or conceal a terrorist.

**Travel or attempt to travel** is addressed under the material support provisions of Title 18 of the U.S. Code. [Section 2339B](#) criminalizes the providing of material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations, while [Section 2339A](#) criminalizes providing material support to terrorists, where 'material support or resources' under these provisions include personnel, meaning one or more individuals who may be or include oneself. Additionally, [Section 2339D of Title 18 of the U.S. Code](#) specifically makes it an offense to receive military-type training from or on behalf of a foreign terrorist organization, within or outside of the territory of the United States. Finally, [Section 1542 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code](#) can be relevant to travel and its facilitation, as it makes it an offense to make any false statement in a passport application for himself or someone else or to use or attempt to use or furnish to another for use any passport obtained by this false statement, and provides for an increased imprisonment provision if related to the facilitation of an act of international terrorism.

**Receiving and providing training** for terrorist purposes are addressed by [Section 2339A](#) and [Section 2339B of Title 18 of the U.S. Code](#), which deal with providing material support. Material support includes providing training for terrorism purposes (Section 2339A, subsection (b)(1)), as well as providing oneself to work under the direction or control of a terrorist organization (Section 2339B, subsection (h)). Furthermore, [Section 2339D](#) specifically makes it an offense to receive military-type training from or on behalf of a foreign terrorist organization, within or outside of the territory of the United States.

Various sections of Title 18 of the U.S. Code criminalize **attempt or conspiracy to commit** terrorist offenses. [Section 2332f of Title 18 of the U.S. Code](#) deals with bombings of places of public use, government facilities, public transportation systems and infrastructure facilities; [Section 2332g](#) with missiles intended to destroy aircrafts and [Section 2332h](#) with radiological dispersal devices, making it unlawful to 'knowingly produce, construct, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or possess and threaten to use' various materials outlined under this provision. [Section 2332i of Title 18 of the U.S. Code](#) makes it an offense to knowingly and unlawfully possess radioactive material or make or possess a device, including conspiracy or attempt to do so.

## Rehabilitation and reintegration measures

In the United States, there is no federal program for reintegration and rehabilitation of foreign terrorist fighters or violent extremist offenders, neither in prison, nor after release. However, local initiatives do exist that are led by civil society and NGOs, often in cooperation with different federal agencies, and usually with funding from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

In **Boston, MA**, with financial support from the DHS, the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security partnered with the Massachusetts Department of Corrections to implement a project aimed at preventing escalation to extremist violence and the radicalization of vulnerable individuals, establishing trust, and building resilience. This project targeted men recognized as high-risk individuals for violent extremism upon their release from maximum-security prison. The project focused on addressing the root causes of violent extremism and recognized that strengthening certain protective factors and skills, such as problem solving and dealing with conflict in a non-violent manner, can promote a strong and resilient community. Moreover, the project emphasized the importance of education, positive engagement with the community, connecting with family and friends, and finding suitable employment.

In **Minneapolis, MI**, a deradicalization program was ordered by a U.S. federal judge and was designed with the input from German deradicalization expert, Daniel Koehler, in 2016. The program was initially set up to evaluate why a group of young Somali-American men radicalized and wanted to join ISIL/Da'esh in Syria. Its goal was to figure out why each defendant became radicalized and propose a plan to turn each away from violent extremism. Minnesota has been viewed as a pioneer in efforts to counter violent extremism, due to its history in working closely with the community on prevention efforts, including partnering with local non-profits to provide funding for youth programs. This is due to the fact that in the past terrorist groups like al-Shabaab and ISIL/Da'esh more recently have been active in trying to recruit foreign terrorist fighters from Minneapolis' large Somali-American community. The participants of the program are violent extremists charged with terrorism-related crimes who were on judge-ordered supervised release in lieu of a prison sentence. The program provides psychological testing and counseling, in addition to religious mentoring. A particular emphasis is also placed on community reintegration strategies in order to achieve a balance between public safety and rehabilitation. The program seeks to strengthen ties with family members to ensure that participants have supportive environments to live in when they return to their communities, work with participants to set up further education, vocational training, or employment plans to restore self-reliance; helps them develop new social networks to distance themselves from previously destructive influences; and provides community mentors who are knowledgeable about religion to advise participants during supervised release.

An in-community reentry and recidivism reduction initiative called **Alternative Pathways** is currently underway at the **Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, CA**. The initiative also received funding from the DHS via their [Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention \(TVTP\)](#) program to reduce recidivism among

inmates who profess white supremacist or Islamic extremist ideals or are members of groups that profess these ideals. The initiative is carried out by the [Counter Extremism Project \(CEP\)](#) and [Parallel Networks](#), who design a curriculum tailored to inmates convicted of terrorism-related offenses or those vulnerable to radicalization to violence in-prison prior to release by offering them 'alternative narratives to extremist ideology.' Alternative Pathways also aims to provide post-release support programming. Moreover, the project will help identify important risk and protective factors that might inform further recidivism reduction and reintegration programs nationally, will lead to a series of publications and trainings, and will establish evidence-based interventions that can be scaled nationally.

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