

# Tunisia

## Introduction

This page provides a country-specific quantitative overview of the foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) phenomenon. This includes, where available, a breakdown of how many individuals departed from or have returned to the country as well as certain demographics within those groups. The data is laid out below in infographics, you can hover over a data point to see its exact figures. Where not enough data is available the table is grayed out. If you can assist in completing this data, please click fill out the questionnaire on our [contact page](#).

Below this information, the page also sets out in detail a qualitative review of the policy measures utilized by or available to the country in response to the FTF phenomenon and provides a list of additional reading material relevant to the FTF situation in the country.

*Last updated: 14 April 2025.*

Tunisia		
<b>Totals</b>	Total (Departed)	c.a. 3,000 <sup>1</sup>
	Total (Non-Returned)	2,300 – 1,500 <sup>2</sup>
	Total (Returned)	970 – 1,500 <sup>3</sup>
<b>Nationality (At Departure)</b>	Tunisian National	-
	Dual Citizen	-
	Resident	-
<b>Gender</b>	Males (Departed)	c.a. 2,300 <sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Counter-terrorism Judicial Pole spokesperson Sofien Selliti, 'Nous ne pouvons pas refuser le retour des éléments terroristes', 11 May 2018, <http://www.lapresse.tn/component/nationals/?task=article&id=147935>; Emna Ben Mustapha Ben Arab, 'Returning foreign fighters: understanding the new threat landscape in Tunisia, in Returnees in the Maghreb: comparing policies on returning foreign terrorist fighters in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia', Renard, T. (ed), 2019, p. 36, <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2019/04/EP107-returnees-in-the-Maghreb.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> Calculation based on fn. 1 and fn. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Hassan, L., 'Repatriating ISIS Foreign Fighters Is Key to Stemming Radicalization, Experts Say, but Many Countries Don't Want Their Citizens Back', Frontline Review, 6 April 2021, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/repatriating-isis-foreign-fighters-key-to-stemming-radicalization-experts-say-but-many-countries-dont-want-citizens-back/>, Emna Ben Mustapha Ben Arab, 'Returning foreign fighters: understanding the new threat landscape in Tunisia, in Returnees in the Maghreb: comparing policies on returning foreign terrorist fighters in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia', Renard, T. (ed), 2019, p. 38, <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2019/04/EP107-returnees-in-the-Maghreb.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> Calculation based on fn. 1 and fn.5.

	Females (Departed)	700 <sup>5</sup>
	Males (Returned)	-
	Females (Returned)	-
<b>Parent Status</b>	Female Parent (Non-Returned)	100 <sup>6</sup>
	Female Non-Parent (Non-Returned)	-
	Female Parent (Returned)	-
	Female Non-Parent (Returned)	-
<b>Current Location (Non-Returned)</b>	Died	552 <sup>7</sup>
	In Camps	-
	In Prison	-
	Operational (in region)	-
	Operational (other regions)	-
	Prosecuted (awaiting trial or convicted and in prison)	-
	Other (Unknown location)	-
<b>Current Legal Status (Non-Returned)</b>	Prosecuted	-
	Held Without Charges	-
	Citizenship Revoked	-
	Trials in Absentia	-
<b>Current Status (Returned)</b>	Citizenship Revoked	-
	Extradited to Third Country	-
	Prosecuted	58 <sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Watanabe, T., The Next Steps of North Africa's Foreign Fighters, CSS Analyses in Security Policy, Fabien Merz (ed), No. 222, March 2018, p. 2, <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse222-EN.pdf>.

<sup>6</sup> Zelin, A. Y., 'Saied's Tunisia is Politicizing Counterterrorism Again', The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Analysis, PolicyWatch 3713, 9 March 2023, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/saieds-tunisia-politicizing-counterterrorism-again>.

<sup>7</sup> Zelin, A. Y., Walles, J., 'Tunisia's Foreign Fighters', Policy Analysis, PolicyWatch 3053, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 17 Dec. 2018, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tunisias-foreign-fighters>.

<sup>8</sup> Number of detainees with final and verdict following terrorism charges, in 2017, Emna Ben Mustapha Ben Arab, 'Returning foreign fighters: understanding the new threat landscape in Tunisia', in Returnees in the Maghreb: comparing policies on returning foreign terrorist fighters in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia,

	Post-release	-
	In Rehabilitation/Reintegration Program	-
	Not prosecuted	-
<b>Method of Return</b>	Own Initiative	-
	Expelled	-
	Repatriated	-
<b>Returnee Attacks</b>	n/a	-

### Preventive measures

#### **National Strategy/Action Plan:**

Two [National Strategies](#) were drafted between 2014 and 2016, the key elements of which are prevention through working on the push and pull factors of youth radicalization, with a particular focus on counter-narrative efforts; the protection and reduction of citizens' vulnerability through a coherent plan based on integrated communication mechanisms; the pursuit and tracking of terrorist groups' resources; and the response and crisis management through mechanisms and legislation adequate to enhancing the efficiency of the intervention. Launched by the [Tunisian Institute for Strategic Studies](#) as an action plan based on UNSC Resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014), the [National Strategy to Counter Extremism \(SNLCET\)](#) was adopted on 7 November 2016, and is based on four pillars: Prevention (Preventing violent extremism, its root causes, legal measures, education, peace promotion, tolerance, prison prevention, rehabilitation, defining extremism); Protection (Counter-Terrorism national strategy plans, intelligence agencies' cooperation, accurate information systems, border control, financing checks), Prosecution (Boosting national anti-terrorism capacity with legal tools, improving global legal cooperation), and Response (Global crisis response, victim support, witness protection, asserting detainee rights).

According to the [4<sup>th</sup> Enhanced Follow-Up Report for the Republic of Tunisia](#) issued by the Middle East and North Africa Financial Task Force (MENAFATF) in October 2017, Tunisia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen its effectiveness in Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, and addressing any related technical deficiencies.

### **Countering terrorism financing :**

The [Organic Law n° 2015-26 of 7 August 2015](#) dealing with combating terrorism and preventing money laundering as amended by [Basic Law 2019-09 of 23 January 2019](#), modernized Tunisia's security legislation, striking a better balance between the protection of human rights and fighting terrorism. This Law has also established the The National Counterterrorism Commission (NCC), which monitors and implements UNSC Resolutions related to combating terrorism. Notably, including [UNSC Resolution 1267 \(1999\)](#) that underpin the United Nations' al-Qa`ida/Taliban/Islamic State sanctions regime, including requiring entities subject to AML/CFT provisions to consult lists on the Ministry of Finance website and to freeze listed individual and group assets, as well as [UNSC Resolution 1373 \(2001\)](#), which aims to enhance international cooperation in the fight against terrorism and to establish measures to prevent and suppress terrorist acts. For instance, this resolution calls on countries to establish a domestic designation capability to respond to requests (beyond the 1267 regime), to freeze terrorism-related funds (paragraph 1.c). The [National Commission for the Fight against Terrorism \(CNLCT\)](#) is authorized to freeze the assets of persons or organizations suspected of providing material support for terrorism. The CNLCT also implemented, in partnership with international actors, a series of initiatives to engage civil society and the private sector to proactively respond to the challenge of violent extremism.

The [Article 66](#) of the [Organic Law](#) creates "The National Committee combating terrorism", which aims to report to the Presidency of the Government that secures its permanent secretary. According to [Article 68](#), the Committee is in charge of overseeing UN decisions, proposing legal procedures against terrorist entities, assessing terrorism risks, issuing guidelines, developing anti-terrorism policies, coordinating national protection efforts, facilitating inter-ministerial communication, collaborating with international bodies, gathering terrorism data, promoting awareness, organizing training, and contributing to updating anti-terrorism legislation for effective national programs.

[Law 2003-75 of 10 December 2003](#) on support for international efforts to combat terrorism and the suppression of money laundering, related to supporting international efforts to combat terrorism and suppress money laundering, as amended by Law No. 2009-65 of August 12, 2009, aims to facilitate compliance with international standards on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CFT) criminalizing money laundering and terrorist financing, and to establish a financial intelligence unit within the Central Bank of Tunisia.

In January 2021, the Tunisian Financial Intelligence Unit in cooperation with the Central Bank, Customs and the Ministry of Interior, as well as the private sector (banks and currency exchange offices) developed and launched a national platform using the blockchain technology called "[Hannibal platform](#)" to gather, storage and analyze related data from all the mentioned stakeholders. The Hannibal platform aims to understand, identify and assess national money laundering and terrorism risks associated with the physical cross-border transport of currency. This platform improves interoperability between traditional banking data and move away from siloed systems with fragmented frameworks, increased automation. The platform enables

Tunisian authorities to take adequate and appropriate measures to mitigate the national risks of money laundering and terrorist financing linked to the physical cross-border circulation of currency.

### **Educational Programs and Initiatives**

The [Organic Law n°2015-26 of 7 August 2015](#) has set up The National Commission on Counter-Terrorism and Radicalization, on 22 March 2016. The institution aims to implement a short, medium and long term strategy. According to Article 68 of the Organic Law, the Commission has to raise social awareness of terrorist threats, through the organization of awareness-raising campaigns, cultural and educational programs, the holding of congresses, colloquia and publication of editions and guides.

### **Strategic communications campaign**

When the national strategy was publicly disclosed at the end of 2016, a decree was adopted by parliament for the creation of a counter-narrative platform, which has become a tool of strategic communications to counter violent extremism. Situated under the Ministry of Relations with Constitutional Bodies, Civil Society and Human Rights, the [Alternative Narrative Platform \(ANP\)](#) includes producing alternative narratives to those of violent extremist groups. It aims to contrast violent radical messages, ranging from activities in the field of communication to proposals for new religious narratives. The Platform produces videos, spots focusing on the values of tolerance and diversity, peace, human rights, citizenship, rules of coexistence, or issues such as the return of FTFs. It also aims to focus on the implementation of a training program for imams to spread and develop tolerant narratives based on more moderate interpretations of Islamic tenets. On 8 of April 2020, the Alternative Narrative Platform launched its national [Counter Violent Extremism's Plan](#) in partnership with the Tunisian Broadcasting Institute to promote messages of tolerance, diversity and acceptance across the media platform. For instance, it has encompassed a website which will provide alternative messages aimed at confronting the growing threat of violent radical propaganda on the Internet. The initiatives of this Platform represent the first tools produced in Tunisia to raise citizens' awareness of the existence of alternative narratives. To enhance its impact, this counter-narrative seeks to be crafted collaboratively with civil society groups. This involves not just conducting social initiatives in regions where youth are vulnerable to radicalization, but also emphasizing grassroots communication. The goal is to enable the ANP to become self-reliant and create effective messaging in tandem with civil society organizations.

[Hedayah's Capacity Building Program](#): Conducted under the guidance of the National Counter Terrorism Commission of Tunisia between January 2019 and November 2019, this program provides support to children and youth vulnerable to or affected by radicalization. Building on the results of the first cycle of this initiative - conducted during 2018 - this program targeted practitioners working in Social Defence and Integration Centers (CDIS) and Child Detention Centers (CDCs). Several lessons learned from 2018 have been integrated into this cycle to ensure improvement and adjustment of the program. The Program aimed to guide practitioners to apply the knowledge and skills acquired, develop sustainable project ideas that ultimately reduce the threat of radicalization for vulnerable youth and children; and support the

rehabilitation and reintegration of youth and children who have been exposed to extremist ideologies.

### Administrative measures

#### **Sanctions Lists:**

By [Decree of January 2018](#), in which the Tunisian government charged the [National Counterterrorism Commission \(NCC\)](#), created by the [Basic Law 2015-26 of 7 August 2015](#), to develop a national sanctions list of designated terrorists as the basis for freezing their assets, implementing both international sanctions and obligations. This list establishes “persons, organizations and entities (...) of which there are relevant and reasonable ground indicating that they committed or attempted to commit a terrorist offense, participated in or facilitated the commission of a terrorist offense, as well as any entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons, organizations or entities or any other entity acting on their behalf or under their direction, or any entity affiliated with them, dissident or derived”. The decree further set forth that the NCC could rely on nominations to the list from domestic CT and CFT agencies, as well as requests from other countries, as stipulated in [UNSC Resolution 1373 \(2001\)](#). The mechanism was implemented on 16 November 2018.

#### **Citizenship/Nationality Deprivation:**

Under Article 25 of [Tunisia's Constitution](#), “No citizen shall be deprived of their nationality, exiled, extradited or prevented from returning to their country”. According to Article 49 of [Tunisia's Constitution](#), restrictions can be made regarding constitutional rights and freedoms and their exercise, since such restrictions are to be established only to satisfy the requirements of a civil and democratic State and to safeguard the rights of others or the requirements of public safety, national defense, public health or public morality. Restrictions must be proportionate to their justifications.

Article 33 of the [Tunisian Nationality Code](#), promulgated by decree of 26 January 1956, in its paragraph (1), allows for the deprivation of Tunisian nationality under specific circumstances, such as: “An individual who has acquired Tunisian nationality may, by decree, be deprived of Tunisian nationality if convicted of an act classified as a crime or offense against the internal or external security of the State; if engaged, on behalf of a foreign State, in acts incompatible with Tunisian nationality and detrimental to the interests of Tunisia; if convicted in Tunisia or abroad for an act classified as a crime under Tunisian law and resulting in a sentence of at least five years' imprisonment (...)”. According to Article 34 of the [Tunisian Nationality Code](#), the alleged acts must have occurred “within a period of ten years from the date of acquisition of Tunisian nationality,” while the deprivation of nationality can only be pronounced “within a period of 5 years from the commission of said acts.” Law No. 2010-55 amended the [Tunisian Nationality Code](#) in 2010 and moved the law of Nationality Deprivation towards gender equality and to prevent the statelessness of the children of returned foreign terrorist fighters deprived of their citizenship. The Law repealed Article 12 and



replaced it with Article 6, “providing Tunisian mothers the right to automatically confer their citizenship to their children”. Indeed, the article stands that a child born to a Tunisian mother is Tunisian – regardless of whether the child is born in Tunisia or abroad, and regardless of the nationality of the child’s father.

#### **Restrictions to the freedom of associations:**

[Decree-law No. 2011-88 of December 2011](#): Since the country’s independence the Law 154 of 1959 governing associations required from associations to obtain approval from the Ministry of Interior. Only those organizations authorized by the state and maintaining its approval were permitted to function. Following the Revolution, [Decree Number 88 of 2011](#) replaced [Law 154](#), representing a significant departure from the previous regime. This Decree offers extensive safeguards for the exercise of freedom of association, endorsing a free and autonomous civil society sector. It includes provisions for public funding and prohibits state interference in the operations of organizations. Moreover, it allows scrutiny over charitable operations (i.e reporting and transparency) by imposing stricter regulations on the creation and the activities of associations. The Decree also aims at disrupting financial networks of extremist organizations and facilitate cooperation in addressing transnational threats. To do so, it provides the authorities with a legal action against organizations found to be supporting or facilitating extremist agendas, and to freeze or seize the assets of those suspected.

### Criminal and surveillance measures

[Tunisian Criminal Code](#) (amended by Law No. 2005-45 of 6 June 2005) criminalizes the **proposal to conspire** to commit one of the attacks against the internal security of the State ([Article 70](#)), the **preparatory act** ([Article 71](#)) and **the incitement of people** people to arm against each other, or provoking disorder, murder, or looting on Tunisian territory ([Article 72](#)). [Article 74](#) criminalizes **assembling and arming** of gangs, or **leading** gangs with the aim of looting State or private funds, seizing or destroying movable or immovable property, or attacking or resisting the forces of law and order acting against the perpetrators of these attack. [Article 75](#) criminalizes the mere **consent to join** terrorist groups or their provision with arms, accommodations, places of retreat, or meeting places.

[Article 131](#) (amended by Law No. 89-23 of February 27, 1989) states that “Any group formed, regardless of its duration and number of members, any agreement established with the aim of preparing or committing an attack against persons or property constitutes an offense against public peace. According to [Article 132](#) (amended by Law No. 95-93 of November 9, 1995) [paragraph 1](#), “Anyone who has **joined a group or participated** in an agreement as described in [Article 131](#) of the Penal Code is punishable by six years’ imprisonment”. Article 133 criminalizes **providing a place of assembly** in order to prepare or organize terrorist acts, while under [Article 134](#) the perpetrators of the offenses mentioned in [Articles 132](#) and [133](#) of this Code are exempt from the penalties provided therein if, before any prosecution, they have

revealed to the competent authorities the established agreement or the existence of the association.

[Organic Law n° 2015-26 of 7 August 2015](#) states in its [Article 31](#) that “is considered to have committed a terrorist crime (...) whoever intends within the republic or outside to **praise publicly and honestly or glorify** by any means a terrorist crime or its perpetrators or a terrorist organization or a consensus that has a relationship with terrorist crimes provided for in this law, or its members or its activity or its opinions and ideas associated with these terrorist crimes”.

[Article 32](#) states that “is considered to have committed a terrorist crime (...) whoever **joins** deliberately through any item inside or outside the Republic, a terrorist organization or a terrorist consensus that has a link with terrorist crimes, a terrorist organization or a terrorist consensus that has links with terrorist crimes provided for in this law, or **trained**, by any means, inside or outside the Republic with the intention of committing a terrorist crime provided for in this law”. Under [Article 33](#), “is considered to have committed a terrorist crime and is liable to imprisonment of six years to twelve years and a fine of 20 000 to 50 000 dinars whoever intentionally commits one of the following acts: use of the territory of the Republic or the territory of a foreign state for the **recruitment or training** of a person or group of persons with the intention of committing one of the terrorist crimes provided for in this law, within or outside the territory of the Republic; using the Republic's territory to commit one of the terrorist crimes provided for in this law against another country or its citizens or to carry out the preparatory work for that; **travelling** outside the territory of the Republic in order to commit one of the terrorist crimes provided for in this law or instigating or receiving or providing training to commit them; ethe territory of the Republic or crossing it in order to travel abroad to commit one of the terrorist crimes provided for in this law, or to incite or to receive or provide training to commit them”.

According to [Article 34 \(1\)](#), “is considered to have committed a terrorist crime and is liable to imprisonment of ten to twenty years and a fine of 50 000 to 100 000 dinars whoever intentionally commits one of the following acts: inform or advise or **facilitate or help or mediate or organize** through any means though without remuneration the entry of a person to the Tunisian territory or leaving it legally or clandestinely either from crossing borders or others in order to commit one of the terrorist crimes provided for in this law; **provide** by any means **material or equipment** or uniforms or means of transport or equipment or foodstuff or websites or documents or photos for the benefit of terrorists or terrorist organizations or consensus having links with terrorist crimes provided for in this law; make skills and experts at the disposal of terrorists or terrorist organizations or consensus having a link with terrorist crimes provided for in this law; **disclose or provide or disseminate information** directly or indirectly, by any means, for the benefit of terrorists or terrorist organizations or consensus having a link with terrorist crimes provided for in this law with the intention to commit such crimes, hide them or benefit from them or not sanction their perpetrators”. [Article 36](#) criminalizes the **funding** with the knowledge of the purpose of committing terrorist crimes, or making people travel from the outside.



Nota bene:

In both Tunisia and Libya, informal activities always have represented a significant portion of the economy. However now the Tunisian “fledging and semi-functioning democracy” has an incentive to prevent cross-border smuggling, which can better prevent FTF departure and identify FTF returns. Indeed, Tunisian returnees from Libya and Tunisian FTFs in Libya were not only involved in perpetrating terrorist attacks back in Tunisia, but also play major role in the local recruitment of FTFs. Therefore, the provisions of Articles 83 to 85 from the [Tunisian Criminal Code](#), criminalizing active and passive corruption, as well as [Article 195](#) criminalizing the issuance of a passport to a person unidentified by the public official, are useful to prevent terrorist travel and recruitment.

**Surveillance:**

The German Ministry of Defense is supporting the development of a [Tunisian Border Security Project](#) (TBSP), namely an electronic border surveillance system. An already-existing barrier is now being extended along the Libyan border to the border town of Borj Al Khadra in the Sahara. The recipient of the initiative is the Tunisian military, while the overall project is planned in cooperation with the US government and is being implemented by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). On 25 March 2016, the latter announced its support to the first part of the project, aiming to provide an integrated border surveillance system based on remotely monitored sensors, along with basic border security equipment and related training for the Tunisian Army and National Guard. On 29 March 2022, U.S. and German Ambassadors to Tunisia joined Minister of National Defense to mark the completion of the second phase of the Tunisian Border Security Project (TBSP). The project aims to strengthen Tunisia’s border security capabilities to counter-terrorism and cross-border smuggling threats.

From April 2015 to January 2019, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development has implemented the [“IBM Tunisia” Support Programme](#) to Integrated Border Management (IBM) in Tunisia. The Program aims to support the implementation of a coordinated national policy on integrated border management in order to contribute to the strengthening of the capacities of the national authorities in the fight against transnational crime and the prevention of irregular migration, and to support the modernization and the strengthening of the national authorities in charge of border control at the land, sea and air Border Crossing Points and in charge of surveillance of the blue and green borders.

From December 2018 to December 2019, the [“IBM Tunisia” II Support Programme](#) has been implemented, whose objective was to contribute to building the capacity for protection, surveillance and border control of the Tunisian border agencies, while facilitating the movement of legitimate travelers and goods.

### Rehabilitation and reintegration measures

The [National Strategy for Addressing Violent Extremism](#) can be considered both as a preventive initiative against radicalization, and a rehabilitation and reintegration

program for deradicalization of returnees. Two of its components, if not the main ones, are Rehabilitation and Reintegration & Aftercare. Indeed, a first section of the Strategy aims to outline the procedures, guidelines, and goals for rehabilitation, which includes disengagement, deradicalization, and restorative measures and programs. The Rehabilitation programs aim to first focus on disengagement, which refers to separating a radicalized individual from engaging or supporting violent behaviors. Meanwhile, the secondary aim of rehabilitation programs is deradicalization, which represents the process where a violent extremist decides to renounce violent extremism. Rehabilitation programs should seek to stabilize the psychological condition of each returnee, repair the relationship between the returnee and society, and foster social and economic normalcy in each returnee's life. The second section of the Strategy aims to discuss the procedures, guidelines, and goals for reintegration and aftercare measures and programs, which aim at bringing an individual back into mainstream society by providing emotional, social, and economic support. It establishes local support systems that satisfy the basic social, economic, and psychological needs of returnees is essential to eliminating the chances of recidivism. The purpose of each meeting is to monitor the reintegration process and identify any complications in the process using evaluation techniques derived from the initial risk assessment.

Under the authority of Ministry of Justice, Tunisia's [General Committee of Prisons and Rehabilitation \(CGPR\)](#) is an administrative public institution with financial and administrative autonomy, working on issues relating to prisons and the rehabilitation of offenders. Its main aim is to improve prison conditions and promote effective rehabilitation programs for prisoners. The committee may be involved in inspecting prisons, evaluating rehabilitation programs, formulating policy recommendations and raising public awareness of issues relating to the prison system. Its work aims to ensure that prisoners' fundamental rights are respected and to promote their successful reintegration into society after their release.

Within this institution, the Directorate General of Prisons and Rehabilitation (DGPR) also worked with the Department of State to integrate community corrections principles such as probation, parole, and the establishment of community reintegration centers to better prepare newly released inmates and mitigate recidivism and radicalization. Under [Law No. 2001-52 of 14 May 2001](#), the General and Re-education Directorate is tasked with implementing prison and re-education policies, enforcing judicial decisions on incarceration and measures for juvenile offenders, securing prisons and re-education centers for detained juvenile offenders, coordinating cooperation among national entities in juvenile delinquency re-education, rehabilitation, and integration, supporting sentencing judges in applying custodial and community service sentences.

Implemented in collaboration with UNODC, the "[Tawassol](#)" program seeks to socially and economically rehabilitate and reintegrate inmates involved in terrorism or radicalized towards violence. This project supports the adoption of the United Nations Minimum Standard Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the [Nelson Mandela Rules](#)) in Tunisia and highlights the critical role of the prison system in maintaining public safety and security. UNODC provides technical guidance on managing high-risk

prisoners, aimed at enhancing the Tunisian prisoner classification system, enabling evidence-based policymaking on preventing violent extremism within prisons, and supporting the implementation of rehabilitation programs for inmates radicalized towards violence. Furthermore, the sportswear and equipment provided by UNOCDC contributes to broader efforts aimed at making prison time constructive and rehabilitative (an essential aspect of initiatives to steer inmates away from the path of violent extremism).

Tunisia emphasized the need to enhance the capacity of the prison service to effectively address the challenge of violent extremism in prisons and joined the “[Global Initiative on Preventing Violent Extremism in Prisons](#)”. In the framework of this initiative, [Tunisia's General Committee of Prisons and Rehabilitation \(CGPR\)](#) hosted four [workshops](#) addressing various aspects of preventing violent extremism within prisons. These workshops provided participants with insights from over 20 experts from diverse countries, offering approaches to mitigate the proliferation of violent extremism behind bars.

### [Additional resources](#)

Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, Tunisia Country Strategy 2020-2022, [https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/imce/MENA/Tunisia\\_Strategy\\_2020-2022.pdf](https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/imce/MENA/Tunisia_Strategy_2020-2022.pdf)

Tasnim Chirchi, Intissar Kherigi, Khaoula Ghribi, Connekt Country Reports : National Approaches to Extremism TUNISIA, European Institute of the Mediterranean, December 2020, [https://h2020connekt.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Tunisia\\_CONNEKT\\_Approaches\\_to\\_extremism.pdf](https://h2020connekt.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Tunisia_CONNEKT_Approaches_to_extremism.pdf)

DGAP, Tunisia's Rocky Road to Stability : Security Sector Reform, (De-) Radicalization and Socio-Economic Development – Policy Briefs from the Region and Europe, DGAP Report, Dina Fakoussa and Laura Lale Kabis-Kechrid (eds), Oct. 2017, [https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article\\_pdfs/tunesien\\_rocky\\_road.pdf](https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/tunesien_rocky_road.pdf)

International Human Rights Clinic, Statelessness and nationality policy in Tunisia, International Human Rights Clinic of the Boston University School of Law, June 2023, [https://www.statelessnessmena.com/wp-content/uploads/7.6-Final-Draft-2023\\_Tunisia-Report.pdf](https://www.statelessnessmena.com/wp-content/uploads/7.6-Final-Draft-2023_Tunisia-Report.pdf)