

Jordan

Introduction

This page provides a country-specific quantitative overview of the foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) phenomenon. This includes, where available, a breakdown of how many individuals departed from or have returned to the country as well as certain demographics within those groups. The data is laid out below in infographics, you can hover over a data point to see its exact figures. Where not enough data is available the table is grayed out. If you can assist in completing this data, please click fill out the questionnaire on our [contact page](#).

Below this information, the page also sets out in detail a qualitative review of the policy measures utilized by or available to the country in response to the FTF phenomenon and provides a list of additional reading material relevant to the FTF situation in the country.

Last updated: 1 December 2025.

Jordan		
Totals	Total (Departed)	c.a. 3000-3950 ¹
	Total (Non-Returned)	c.a. 1250-3000 ²
	Total (Returned)	300 ³
Nationality (At Departure)	Jordanian National	-
	Dual Citizen	-
	Resident	-
Gender	Males (Departed)	2000 ⁴
	Females (Departed)	-
	Males (Returned)	-

¹ Foreign Terrorist Fighters, Manual for Judicial Training Institutes Middle East and North Africa, UNODC, 2021,

https://www.unodc.org/pdf/terrorism/FTFs_manual_final_version_09.04.2021_ENG.pdf; Speckhard, A., 'The Jihad in Jordan: Drivers of Radicalization into Violent Extremism in Jordan', International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism, 25 March 2017, <https://www.icsve.org/the-jihad-in-jordan-drivers-of-radicalization-into-violent-extremism-in-jordan/>.

² As of August 2019. Source: Al-Sharafat, S., 'How Jordan Can Deal with Jordanian ISIS Fighters Still in Syria,' Washington Institute, 9 August 2019, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-jordan-can-deal-jordanian-isis-fighters-still-syria>.

³ Ibid.; Foreign Terrorist Fighters, Manual for Judicial Training Institutes Middle East and North Africa, UNODC, 2021, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/terrorism/FTFs_manual_final_version_09.04.2021_ENG.pdf.

⁴ Abbadi, S., 'Jordan in the Shadow of ISIS', Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 7:2, 2015, p. 8-12, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351315?seq=1>.

	Females (Returned)	-
Parent Status	Female Parent (Non-Returned)	-
	Female Non-Parent (Non-Returned)	-
	Female Parent (Returned)	-
	Female Non-Parent (Returned)	-
Current Location (Non-Returned)	Died	c.a. 1500 ⁵
	In Camps	800-1500 ⁶
	In Prison	250 ⁷
	Operational (In region)	<800 ⁸
	Operational (In other regions)	-
	Prosecuted (Awaiting trial or convicted and in prison)	-
	Other (Unknown location)	-
Current Legal Status (Non-Returned)	Prosecuted	-
	Held Without Charges	-
	Citizenship Revoked	-
	Trials in Absentia	-
Current Status (Returned)	Citizenship Revoked	-
	Extradited to Third Country	-
	Prosecuted	-
	Post-release	-

⁵ Speckhard, A., 'The Jihad in Jordan: Drivers of Radicalization into Violent Extremism in Jordan', International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism, 25 March 2017, <https://www.icsve.org/the-jihad-in-jordan-drivers-of-radicalization-into-violent-extremism-in-jordan/>.

⁶ حدود مغلقة في وجه المقاتلين الأردنيين بسوريا.. فأين المفر؟: أيمن فضيلات, AlJazeera, 18 July 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2018/7/18/%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%BA%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86>.

⁷ Speckhard, A., 2017.

⁸ Jordanian, Moroccan, Tunisian, Egyptian, and Turkish fighters make up the Guardians of Religion Organisation which comprises of approximately 800 fighters. Source: الإدارة السورية وحلّ مشكلة: عمر كوش, AlJazeera, 11 June 2025,

<https://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/2025/6/11/%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86>. However, together with their families, the number of Jordanians still in the region can be up to 1500, according to أيمن فضيلات, AlJazeera, 18 July 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2018/7/18/%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%BA%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86> ;

Abadi, S., 'Jordan in the Shadow of ISIS', Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 7:2, 2015, p. 8-12, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351315?seq=1>.

	In Rehabilitation/Reintegration Program	-
	Not prosecuted	-
Method of Return	Own Initiative	-
	Expelled	-
	Repatriated	-
Returnee Attacks		-

Preventive measures

Jordan's [National Preventing Violent Extremism \(PVE\) Strategy](#) is coordinated by the Office of the Prime Minister. Priority engagement areas include countering violent extremist ideology, building social cohesion among civil society, and assisting law enforcement. The Strategy is carried out by the Public Security Directorate (PSD), in cooperation with Community Peace Centers (CPC) and law enforcement. CPCs play a pivotal role in Jordan's prevention and counterterrorism strategies, as they are the main contact points between government and local actors. CPCs and local police departments use innovative approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), such as interactive theater, creative writing and strategic communications. Jordan is a member of the Strong Cities Network, which in cooperation with the [West Asia-North Africa \(WANA\) Institute](#), supports the role of municipalities and local communities in preventing violent extremism by building capacity, raising awareness, and enhancing community resilience.

Within its PVE strategy, Jordan has launched a number initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue between religions, sects, and civilizations, as well as to emphasize the true, peaceful face of Islam, such as the "Amman Message," "A Common Word" and the "World Interfaith Harmony Week."

The [Jordanian National Action Plan \(JONAP\)](#) for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2018–2021 highlights the importance of women in preventing violent extremism within their communities and acknowledges that "women-led organizations play an active role in promoting peace and security, under the umbrella of creating social harmony and promoting development." Further, it states that "as active members of their community, and through their roles as wives, sisters, mothers, leaders and educators, women can use their influence to raise awareness, detect early warning signs of violent extremism and support efforts to prevent it." Hence, the JONAP calls for the inclusion of women in all aspects of preventing violent extremism, including the programming, design and delivery of such strategies. In line with promoting gender awareness within law

enforcement, Canada implemented the [HASBANI project](#) in 2022, which was a Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP) aimed at improving the participation of Jordanian female police officers in operational roles in counterterrorism (CT) crisis response. The project drew on good practices from women-led civil society organizations in other contexts, to consider how combining women's participation with a community policing approach strengthens the ability of the security sector to provide a positive alternative to women's participation in violent extremist groups.

Jordan is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and its FIU, the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group.

Administrative measures

The Public Prosecutor or the General Intelligence Directorate can impose **house arrest** to combat terrorism. This measure may be challenged in front of the State of Security Court. The regulation is contained under [Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law](#). The Public Prosecutor or the General Intelligence Directorate may **prevent the imminent travel of an individual** to combat terrorism. The individual may challenge this measure in front of the State of Security Court. This regulation is contained under [Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law](#).

The Cabinet, upon approval from the King, may **revoke the Jordanian citizenship of an individual** on grounds of protecting national security. The measure suggests it cannot be challenged. The regulation is contained in [Article 18 of the Citizenship Law](#).

The Public Prosecutor can restrict the freedom to leave the country or temporarily seize, retain, cancel/ revoke or refuse to issue or renew the passport of a national. This measure can be taken to combat terrorism, however, the individual can challenge the order in front of the State Security Court. The measure is contained in [Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law](#).

The National Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Committee may add entities to a **watchlist** and/or a **sanctions list** on the grounds of combating terrorism. The measures can be challenged before the respective judicial authority. These regulations is contained within the [Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Law](#).

Criminal and surveillance measures

In Jordan, [Article 7\(f\) of the Anti-Terrorism Law No. 55 \(2006\)](#) criminalizes any form of participation, including **interference in, incitement to, or assistance in** the commission of crimes listed under [Article 3](#) of this law. Article 3, amongst others, contains crimes related to terrorism, such as carrying out terrorist attacks, financing terrorist acts or joining a terrorist group.

[Article 3 of the Anti-Terrorism Law No. 55 \(2006\)](#) criminalizes **recruitment** for joining or training in any armed group or terrorist organization, within and outside of the country.

Support for terrorist groups is mentioned under [Article 3\(e\)](#) of Jordan's Anti-Terrorism Law No. 55 (2006), where support is mentioned in connection with using information technology, the internet or any means of publishing, as well as creating a website in order to facilitate the perpetration of terrorist acts, or to support a group, organization or association that carries out terrorist acts. Joining or attempting to join a terrorist group is criminalized under [Article 3\(c\)](#).

Training is mentioned under [Article 3\(c\) of the Anti-Terrorism Law No. 55 \(2006\)](#), in the context of training someone for a terrorist organization, within or outside of the country.

Finally, preparatory acts are criminalized under [Article 3\(e\) of the Anti-Terrorism Law No. 55 \(2006\)](#), which punishes carrying out via any direct or indirect means, providing, collecting or procuring funds with the intent of using them to commit a terrorist act or to finance terrorists.

Jordan has established a compulsory requirement for the private sector to cooperate and provide information relating to money laundering and terrorism. Jordan also uses advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record systems, which allow it to screen inbound and outbound passengers for potential terrorists and criminal actors. Notably, Jordan uses INTERPOL databases at ports of entry to detect departing/returning FTFs.

Rehabilitation and reintegration measures

In Jordan, a variety of programs (both public and private) have emerged as a response to Jordanians leaving to join the ranks of the Islamic State and then attempting to return. Once Jordan agreed to start receiving its nationals who had left to Iraq and

Syria, the state was forced to define its policy and subsequent programs. The public sector extended its control over the case, claiming that private sector programs were inherently driven by financial gains, whereas the private sector argued that public sector programs were highly securitized and secretive.

As a result, one tangible program has surfaced to address returnees: a joint effort between the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Public Security Department (PSD), which resulted in the establishment of the Community Peace Center (CPC) in 2015. The CPC, which is one of the primary deradicalization administrators in Jordan, administers an initiative referred to as the '**Hiwar**' (Dialogue) Program. For the most part, the PSD's CPC took complete control of this program, only coordinating with the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) and the MOI. The main tenant of this program is an interactive dialogue between returnees and state-selected religious scholars. The program classifies the returnees into three categories: those whose violent extremist mindset is deeply rooted and thus hard to counter; those whose thoughts are extreme but can be countered; and those who are least extreme and can easily be countered. This typology was designed in accordance with the findings of multiple studies commissioned by CPC or acquired through open source research.

The program looks to understand the returnees' perspectives in order to formulate a profile for each returnee to baseline their stories, categorize the level of their extremism, distinguish between their reasons and their drivers, and track changes in their thought and behavior. Religious counter-messaging is a key tenet of the Dialogue Program; the program's scholars speak with returnees individually and collectively throughout. These sessions are conducted in the corrective facilities/prisons where the returnees are serving their sentences. It is worth noting that they are not kept in the same prisons as other inmates, to avoid further radicalization. This decision was the result of a collaboration between the CPC and Penal Reform International (PRI), which remains the only nongovernmental organization to be consulted on this program. Together they worked on reforming strategies of rehabilitation centers, particularly as concerns the non-mixing of residents (radicalized and non-radicalized) and ensuring fair treatment.

The program assesses each case individually, examining returnees' behavior while incarcerated as well as the extent to which they are considered "deradicalized" and ready to reintegrate into society. The selected scholars play a large role in assessing their level of extremism or lack thereof before the final assessment determines how much of a danger they pose to themselves and to society. The program then monitors returnees after their release in an effort to ensure their personal safety, the safety of others, and to some extent their livelihoods. Administrators also work on providing graduates of the program with jobs, but this can be dependent on funding available.

Additional Resources

Abbadi, S., 'Jordan in the Shadow of ISIS', Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 7:2, 2015, p. 8-12, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351315?seq=1>

Abu Dalhoum, M., et al, 'Deradicalization of Returnees to Jordan and Morocco: Limitations, Strengths, and Lessons for the Region', IMES Capstone Paper Series, Middle East Studies Program and Institute for Middle East Studies, May 2020, <https://imes.elliott.gwu.edu/app/uploads/2021/10/Deradicalization-ofReturnees-to-Jordan-and-Morocco.pdf>

Al-Sharafat, S., 'How Jordan Can Deal with Jordanian ISIS Fighters Still in Syria,' Washington Institute, 9 August 2019, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-jordan-can-deal-jordanian-isis-fighters-still-syria>

Darden, J.T., Hassan, D., 'Citizenship, Family Law, and the Repatriation of Islamic State Affiliates in MENA', Terrorism and Political Violence, 2023, DOI: [10.1080/09546553.2023.2188961](https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2023.2188961)

Foreign Terrorist Fighters, Manual for Judicial Training Institutes Middle East and North Africa, UNODC, 2021, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/terrorism/FTFs_manual_final_version_09.04.2021_ENG.pdf

Harper, E., Bondokji, N.: Journey Mapping of Selected Jordanian Foreign Fighters, West Asia-North Africa Institute, August 2017, https://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Publication_JourneyMapping_English_0.pdf

Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC), 'The Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters from the Arab World in the Syrian Civil War, most of them Fighting in the Ranks of Organizations Affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Global Jihad', ITIC Study, May 2014, <https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/20646/>